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ABSTRACT
Job interview simulation with a virtual agents aims at im-
proving people’s social skills and supporting professional in-
clusion. In such simulators, the virtual agent must be ca-
pable of representing and reasoning about the user’s men-
tal state based on social cues that inform the system about
his/her affects and social attitude. In this paper, we propose
a formal model of Theory of Mind (ToM) for virtual agent in
the context of human-agent interaction that focuses on the
affective dimension. It relies on a hybrid ToM that combines
the two major paradigms of the domain. Our framework is
based on modal logic and inference rules about the mental
states, emotions and social relations of both actors. Finally,
we present preliminary results regarding the impact of such
a model on natural interaction in the context of job inter-
views simulation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Intelligent
agents
General Terms
Theory, Experimentation
Keywords
Theory of Mind, Cognitive Models, Logic-Based Approaches,
Human-Agent Interaction, Affective Computing, Serious Games
for Inclusion
1. INTRODUCTION AND POSITIONING
During the last decade, several projects have proposed to use
intelligent virtual agents in digital games for user empow-
erment [19, 22, 23, 2, 5]. The work presented in this paper
considers the use of virtual agents in job interview simulation
games for young unemployed peoples, a.k.a NEETs1. Cur-
rent research reveals that NEETs often lack self-confidence
1NEET is a government acronym for young people not in
employment, education or training. According to Eurostat,
and the essential social skills needed to seek and secure em-
ployment [9]. Training with a virtual agent can help them
acquire self-confidence and improve their social skills. In-
deed, it has already been proven that training at job inter-
views with a virtual agent could improve the performance
[17].
The role of the virtual agent in such training games is to be
able to react in a coherent manner: based on the non-verbal
inputs (smiles, emotion expressions, body movements), the
agent must select relevant verbal and non-verbal responses.
In this context, several work illustrated the role of emotion
regulation in the context of job interviews. For instance,
in [29], a study shows that people who tried to suppress or
hide negative emotions during a job interview are consid-
ered more competent by evaluators. Similarly, Tiedens [30]
shows that anger and sadness play an important role in job
interviews. For this reason, credible simulation of emotions
appears as a key issue when it comes to using virtual agents
in job interview simulations.
Most existing models for virtual agents rely on a reactive ap-
proach, in which the system does not manipulate or reason
on the mental states of the interlocutor [17, 22, 23]. How-
ever, in human psychology, Theory of Mind (ToM) refers
to the ability of human beings and primates to interpret,
predict and even influence others’ behavior [4]. Such an
ability is a key feature in the development of intelligent vir-
tual agents in the context of tutoring and training systems.
In this paper, we propose a new model of ToM for virtual
agent in the context of job interview simulation.
The next section briefly discusses existing research that serves
as a basis to our work. Sections 3 and 4 present the general
architecture and the logical framework for our ToM. Section
5 describes our implementation of this model in the context
of job interviews simulation. An outline of the preliminary
evaluation we conducted is given in Section 6. Finally, re-
sults and perspectives are discussed in Section 6.3.
2. RELATEDWORK
In order to be able to reason on the affective dimension of the
interaction, conveyed by the non-verbal behaviour of both
in march 2012, 5.5 million of European youngster (16 to
25 years old) were unemployed meaning that 22.6% of the
youngster global population in European union is unem-
ployed. This unemployment percentage is 10 points supe-
rior to the whole population showing that the employment
of NEETs is a real problem in Europe.
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interlocutors, several models rely on the cognitive structure
of emotions and appraisal theories such as CPM [27] or OCC
[21]. These theories provide domain-independant descrip-
tions of triggering conditions of emotions, that are required
for the development the affective aspect of the ToM reasoner.
For instance, [1, 11] are BDI-based implementation of the
OCC theory. FAtiMA’s double appraisal model [3], although
not implemented using a BDI framework, also encodes the
OCC model. However, in these models, the inference mech-
anism itself encodes the chosen Appraisal Theory. On the
contrary, in our model, we propose a theory-independant
ToM reasoner. While our experiments were conducted us-
ing an OCC-based model, the corresponding rules (described
in equation 20) could be easily replaced by another theory.
To support such adaptability, we propose to rely on the BDI
model. Several computational models of emotions have al-
ready been proposed (e.g. [16, 11]) that show that BDI is a
good basis to represent and to reason about the interlocu-
tor’s mental state. Our aim is thus to define a logical model
of emotions and ToM in BDI.
From the philosophical point of view, a debate about how
ToM is processed by human adults opposes two theories.
The theory-theory(TT) argues for a folk-psychology reason-
ing, i.e. a set of rules one acquires regarding human mind
functioning. [8]. The simulation-theory (ST) [13] defends
a mirroring or projection process allowing for taking some-
one else’s perspective. Various research demonstrated that
neither pure TT nor pure ST were realistic [31] and both
theorists and simulationists turn toward more hybrid mod-
els [8][13].
Existing computational ToM models either imply a choice
between the TT and ST theories (e.g. [3] that relies on a
ST approach, or [7] and [25] that position in the TT) or im-
plement them separately as in [15]. In our work, we propose
a hybrid approach that relies on theory-theory to model the
agent’s mental states and commonsense rules, but also on
simulation-theory to others’ perspective by projecting at-
tributed mental states on its own inference engine. Both
models are integrated in the same reasoner.
3. ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW
Our ToM reasoning architecture consists of two main com-
ponents, as presented on Figure 1.
Figure 1: General architecture allowing for modeling hybrid
Theory of Mind.
The agent’s mental states contains beliefs, attitudes, goals
and intentions. Beliefs represent knowledge about general
facts, rules of the world (i.e. commonsense knowledge from
the theory-theory) and mental states of self or other’s (i.e.
attributed mental states). Attitudes represent appreciations
of the current state of affairs and, by extension, desires (what
the agent wants to be true in the future) and ideals (what the
agents would like to be always true). Goals and intentions
form the deliberative aspect, limited to immediate actions.
The agent’s inference engine contains three parts. The
folk-psychology deliberative reasoner is responsible for in-
tention generation (according to the agent’s beliefs and at-
titudes) and updating mental state. The Commonsense rea-
soner’s role it to enrich the agent’s beliefs base using com-
monsense rules and facts. Finally, the emotional inference
engine computes emotion based on the appraisal theory.
Our hybrid ToM modeling relies on: 1) a TT approach based
on folk-psychology and commonsense to reason about oth-
ers, and 2) a ST approach consisting in projecting their at-
tributed mental states on the agent’s own inference engine.
The following section details this logical model.
4. LOGICAL FRAMEWORK
In the following,
def
= and
def
=⇒ respectively mean equals by
definition and implies by definition. The former is used to
define new operators as functions of others and the latter to
express inference rules.
4.1 Syntax
Assume finite sets of atomic propositions ATM , physical
actions ACT , illocutionary (speech) acts ILL, agents AGT ,
emotions EMO (which is a subset of the twenty two OCC
emotions in our model), and the intervals of real numbers
DEG = [−1, 1] and DEG+ = [0, 1]. ATM describes facts
or assertions (e.g. salary is bad, picnic is fun) or external
events such as rain starts falling. ACT describes actions
that the agents or humans (AGT ) may perform, e.g. intro-
duce itself or have a picnic.
Our model defines events as acts in which at least one of
the actors of the interaction take part. Elements in EV T
are tuples in AGT × AGT × (ACT ∪ ILL(ATM)) where
the first element is the actor that performs the action, the
second is a passive agent and the act can be either an actions
(ACT ) or a speech act (ILL). This representation is similar
to the one in [20] except we associate a subjective degree
of plausibility as is usually done in BDI models and we do
not distinguish actions from communcation. Illocutionnary
speech acts have the form ς(ϕ) and mean “actor utters ϕ to
recipient through the illocutionary act ς”.
The language we define is the set of formulas described by
the following BNF (Backus-Naur-Form):
Evt :  ::= 〈a, (a|∅), α〉 | 〈a, a, Spk(ς, ϕ)〉
Prp : pi ::= p |  |Likeka,b |Domka,b
Fml : ϕ ::= pi |Bella(ϕ) |Attka(ϕ) | Inta(ϕ) |Emoia,(b|∅)(ε, ϕ) |
N(ϕ) |U(ϕ,ϕ) | ¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ ϕ
(1)
where a, b ∈ AGT , α ∈ ACT , p ∈ ATM ,  ∈ EV T , ε ∈
EMO, ς ∈ ILL, l, i ∈ DEG+, k ∈ DEG. Like, Dom,
Bel, Att and Int are modal operators and N , and U are
temporal operators Next and Until from LTL and CTL*
[24]. The other temporal operators F and G and boolean
conditions >, ⊥, ∨ and ⇒ are defined in the standard way.
Moreover, in the events’ representation, we use “−” as the
any operator.
For the representation of social relation [18], Likeka,b deter-
mines the level of liking agent a has for agent b, whileDomka,b
represents the degree of dominance.
Bella(ϕ) is a graded belief, in a similar manner to [11], and
has to be read “a believes that ϕ with certainty l”. For in-
stance, Bel1a(ϕ) means “a is sure that ϕ” and Bel
0
a(ϕ) can
be read “For a, ϕ is not plausible at all”.
Similarly, Attka(ϕ) is a graded attitude that has to be read
“a appreciates/values the fact that ϕ with a degree l”. In our
context, this operator will be used to cover various notions,
such as Desires, Ideals and Goals that are represented with
distinct modal operators in other work such as [1] and [14].
We define desires as a positive attitude toward future facts
and ideals as what the agents would like to be always true:
Deska(ϕ)
def
= Attka(F (ϕ))
Idealk>0a (ϕ)
def
= Attk>0a (G(ϕ)) = Des
−k<0
a (¬ϕ)
(2)
The definition of goals through attitudes will be presented
in the next subsection.
Note that in our model, the subject of an attitude can as well
be preserving forest, being nice to others, hiring new employee
or Bellb(〈a, c, give sandwich〉), eventually encapsulated in
temporal operators.
As in classical BDI, Inta(ϕ) represents an agent’s plan [26]
and has to be read ”a intends to make ϕ true” (with ϕ being
an event in the general case).
Emoia,(b|∅)(ε, ϕ) represent emotions. Following classical lit-
erature [12], our emotions are related to facts and can be
directed toward an agent. Emoia,(b|∅)(ε, ϕ) has to be read “a
feels ε, eventually for/towards b, with intensity i, regarding
the fact that ϕ” with ε ∈ EMO. In the following sections, it
will be simplified into εia,(b|∅)(ϕ).
For the sake of readability, we introduce new operators to
represent agents’ involvement in an event. Respa expresses
a direct responsibility. Unlike [1, 14], we do not consider an
agent responsible for a situation it could have avoided. Wita
means that the agent witnessed the occurrence of the event:
Respa()
def
= ( = 〈a,−,−〉)
Wita()
def
= ( = 〈a,−,−〉) ∨ ( = 〈−, a,−〉)
(3)
4.2 Semantics
Based on possible world semantics, we define a frame F =
〈W,B,D, I, E〉 as a tuple where:
• W is a nonempty set of possible worlds,
• B : AGT → (W → 2W ) is the function that associates
each agent a ∈ AGT and possible world w ∈W to the
set of belief-accessible worlds Ba(w),
• D : AGT → (W ×DEG+ → 2W ) is the function that
associates each agent a ∈ AGT and possible world
w ∈ W with a level of desirability l ∈ DEG+ to the
set of desire-accessible worlds Da(w, l),
• I : AGT → (W → 2W ) is the function that associates
each agent a ∈ AGT and possible world w ∈W to the
set of intention-accessible worlds Ia(w), and
• E : EV T → W is the function that associates each
event  ∈ EV T to the resulting possible world.
Then, a model M = 〈F ,V〉 is a couple where F is a frame
and V : W → ATM a valuation function.
Given a model M we note M, w |= ϕ a formula ϕ that is
true in a world w. Truth conditions of formulas are defined
by induction in the classical way:
• M, w |= p iff p ∈ V(w);
• M, w |= ¬ϕ iff not M, w |= ϕ;
• M, w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ψ ;
• M, w |= Bella(ϕ) iff card(GBa(w))card(Ba(w)) = l
where GBa(w) = {v ∈ Ba(w) ; M, v |= ϕ} ;
• M, w |= Desla(ϕ) iff M, v |= ϕ ∀v ∈ Da(w, l);
• M, w |= Inta(ϕ) iff M, v |= ϕ ∀v ∈ Ia(w);
• M, w |=  iff M, v |= > ∀v ∈ E();
The truth condition ofBella(ϕ) states that the level of plausi-
bility of ϕ is the proportion of belief-accessible worlds where
ϕ is true. The next subsections describe the rules for the in-
ference engines presented in section 3. When required, the
computation of believability, desirability and intensity de-
grees will be represented by a f function that is part of the
implementation and will not be detailed in this section (see
section 5 instead).
4.3 Folk-psychology reasoner
4.3.1 Graded beliefs
Following [11] and [1], all accessibility relations B are tran-
sitive and euclidean, which ensures that the agent is aware
of its own beliefs2:
Bella(ϕ)
def
=⇒ Bel1a(Bella(ϕ)) (4)
We generalize (4) so that agents are aware of their own men-
tal states, social relations and involvement.
However, unlike other models [1] [11], B is not serial3. Only
GB is. This represents the fact that the agent generally has
uncertainty about states of affairs. Intuitively:
Bella(ϕ)
def
=⇒ Bel1−la (¬ϕ) (5)
2If wRv and vRu, then successively by transitivity, euclidi-
anity and transitivity again: wRv and vRv.
3A relation R is serial iff ∀w, ∃v so that wRv.
For convenience, we define two thresholds mod th and str th
wich 0.5 < mod th < str th. They correspond to situations
where the agent moderately (Bell>mod tha (ϕ)) and strongly
(Bell>str tha (ϕ)) believes something.
Finally, if an agent believes a state of affairs to possibly
cause another, it will deduce a belief about it:
Bella(ψ) ∧Bell
′
a (ψ ⇒ ϕ) def=⇒ Belf(l,l
′)
a (ϕ) (6)
4.3.2 Graded attitudes
Attitudes can be positive or negative and we assume that
agents hold consistent desires:
M, w |= (Attka(ϕ) ∧Attk
′
a (¬ϕ)) iff k = −k′ (7)
However, indirect inconsistency is still possible: an agent
might want something that can possibly lead to or be caused
by (the occurrence of) the negation of another desire of his.
The consistency is then preserved at the level of desire adop-
tion:
Deska(ϕ) ∧Bell>str tha (ψ ⇒ F (ϕ)) ∧ ¬IncDeska(ψ)
def
=⇒ N(Deska(ψ))
(8)
with IncDeska(ϕ) representing inconsistent desires:
IncDeska(ϕ)
def
= (Bell>str tha (ϕ⇒ ¬ψ) ∧Desk
′>0
a (ψ))
∨(Bell>str tha (ϕ⇒ ψ) ∧Desk
′<0
a (ψ))
(9)
This means that desiring ϕ is inconsistent when the agent
strongly beliefs it might lead to an undesirable ψ. We allow
for adopting indirectly inconsistent desires only when the
agent only believes moderately that there can be a certain
incompatibility with existing ones.
We also define a weaker case of inconsistency where ϕ leads
to an undesirable state of affairs of a higher level:
WIncDeska(ϕ)
def
= Bell>str tha (ϕ⇒ ¬ψ)
∧Desk′;|k′|>|k|a (ψ)
(10)
4.3.3 Goals
Following the BDI model [26], goals are defined as desires
that are consistent – at least weakly, in our case – and be-
lieved to be achievable. To this purpose, we introduce a new
threshold des th:
Goalk>0a (ϕ)
def
= Desk>des tha (ϕ)∧Bella(F (ϕ))∧¬WIncDeska(ϕ)
(11)
Goals are then turned into intentions either because the
agent can achieve it:
Goalk>0a () ∧Respa() def=⇒ N(Inta()) (12)
or, similarly to [7], because the agent strongly believes there
is – at least – one mean to achieve it:
Goalk>0a (ϕ) ∧Bell>str tha (ψ ⇒ F (ϕ)) ∧ ¬WIncDeska(ψ)
∧Bell′a (F (ψ)) def=⇒ N(Inta(ψ))
(13)
We leave it to the implementation phase (section 5) to decide
how intentions are ordered when several possible known ψ
can be used to achieve a goal.
4.3.4 Intentions and acts
Since intentions are generated from desires all accessibility
relations I are serial: M, w 6|= Inta(¬ϕ) ifM, w |= Inta(ϕ)
If an agent intends a state of affairs and knows a means to
achieve it, it will also intend the latter:
Inta(ϕ) ∧Bell>str tha (ψ ⇒ F (ϕ)) def=⇒ Inta(ψ) (14)
Additionally, if an agent intends an act which it is responsi-
ble for, it will perform it in the next step:
Inta() ∧Respa() def=⇒ N() (15)
Furthermore, when an event occurs, we propagate responsi-
bility to all the states of affairs it is believed to have caused:
Belda(ψ) ∧Bella(Respb(ψ)) ∧Bell
′
a (ϕ) ∧Bell
′′
a (ψ ⇒ F (ϕ))
def
=⇒ Belf(l,l′,l′′)a (Respb(ϕ))
(16)
Finally, as far as accessibility relations E are concerned, we
consider any witness believes with degree 1 that the event
happened and that the other witness also believes it. Note
that when an event occurs, the belief that it happened re-
mains true afterwards.
4.3.5 Updating attitudes
Beliefs are updated as new events occur (except for ideals
that are constant and hold globally). In order for the agent
to react to situation change, attitudes about new states of
affairs have to be triggered. In our model, following [20, 10,
3], the attitude is influenced not only by new beliefs, but also
by the attitude of others and the social relation. Formally:
Bell>str tha (ϕ) ∧Attka(F (ϕ)) ∧Bell
′
a (Att
k′
b (F (ϕ)))
∧Likeha,b ∧Domh
′
a,b
def
=⇒ Attf(k,k′,h,h′)a (ϕ)
Bell>str tha (Des
k
b (ϕ)) ∧ Likek
′>0
a,b
def
=⇒ N(Desf(k,k′)a (ϕ)))
(17)
4.3.6 Speech acts and social interaction
Beliefs can also be updated through communication. Al-
though our work mostly focus on non-verbal communica-
tion, we consider a limited set of illocutionnary acts [28]
ILL = {Assert, Request, Commit, Express}.
Based on similar work in speech acts formalization [16, 14],
we define trigering rules for our speech acts. For instance:
¬Bel1a(Intb(ϕ)) ∧ Inta(Intb(ϕ)) def=⇒ Requesta,b(ϕ) (18)
In turn, these events will lead to new mental states for the
recipient agent, similarly to classical FIPA semantics and
existing work on social interaction modeling [16, 10]. For
the sake of conciseness, we only present these two examples
here:
Assertb,a(ϕ) ∧ Likeka,b ∧Domk
′
a,b
def
=⇒ N(Belf(k,k′)a (ϕ))
Requestb,a(ϕ) ∧Domk<0a,b def=⇒ N(Inta(ϕ)))
(19)
4.4 Emotional inference engine
The emotional inference engine consists of a set of appraisal
rules for emotion categories EMO. In this implementation,
we have used an OCC-based model, highly inspired by [1,
14, 11]. Here are some examples of triggering conditions for
each group of emotions.
Bella(γ) ∧Attk>0a (γ) def=⇒ N(Joyi=f(l,k)a (γ))
Bella(F (γ)) ∧Desk<0a (γ) def=⇒ N(Feari=f(l,k)a (γ))
Belda(γ) ∧Bella(Attk<0b (γ)) ∧ Likek
′<0
a,b
def
=⇒ N(Gloatingi=f(l,k,k′,d)a,b (γ))
Bella(γ) ∧ Idealka(γ)∧Bell
′
a (Rspb(γ))
def
=⇒ N(Admirationi=f(l,l′,k)a,b (γ))
Bella(γ) ∧ Idealka(γ)∧Bell
′
a (Rspb(γ)) ∧Goalk
′
a (γ)
def
=⇒ N(Gratitudei=f(l,l′,k,k′)a,b (γ))
(20)
Please note that γ is a proposition that do not involve any
temporal operator. Besides, the intensity of an emotion is a
combination of the degree of certainty of beliefs and the de-
gree of desirability in attitudes. Depending on the appraisal
model, the degree of certainty can represent the sense of re-
ality, the unexpectedness, the likelihood and the realization.
The degree of desirability can correspond to desirability-for-
self but also to praiseworthiness [1].
In OCC [21], Gratification, Remorse, Gratitude and Anger
are defined as Well-being/Attribution emotions, triggered
when one focuses both on the praiseworthiness of an action
and on its desirability. However, in our model, these two no-
tions overlap since ideals are deduced from attitude. Never-
theless, similarly to [14] we think that one might distinguish
Gratitude and Anger from Admiration and Reproach if the
triggering state of affairs corresponds to a goal, that is to
say it is not only praiseworthy but is also desirable and con-
sistent enough to generate an intention of achievement.
4.5 Commonsense reasoner
The commonsence reasoner allows the agent to acquire new
beliefs based on a set of commonsense rules. It is mostly
domain-dependent. Section 5 describes how we used it to
implement a job interview simulation scenario. Here is a
simple example of how this reasoner can combine with the
folk-psychology inference engines presented above.
4.5.1 Example
Consider two friends John (J) and Mary (M) having a con-
versation about their holidays. Mary is going to her home-
town (ht). The fact that she is going to visit her father is a
detail she could either mention or not:
Des0.77M (talking about holidays) (input)
Bel0.8M (〈M,J, visiting ht and dad〉
=⇒ F (talk about holidays)) (input)
Bel0.8M (〈M,J, visiting ht〉
=⇒ F (talk about holidays)) (input)
Nevertheless Mary remembers John recently lost his father
and thus supposes it is a sensitive topic:
Bel1M (J lost his dad) (input)
Bel0.76M (J lost his dad =⇒ Ideal0.8J (¬〈−, J, dad〉))(input)
(=⇒)BellM (Ideal0.8J (¬〈−, J, dad〉)) (6)
Of course, Mary knows that saying she is going to visit her
father implies actually talking about her father:
Bel0.8M (〈M,−, visiting ht and dad〉 =⇒ 〈M,−, dad〉)(input)
And, knowing that John wants to avoid this topic, she does
too. Hence, she is will not mention the fact that she is
visiting her father when talking about her holidays:
(=⇒)IdealkM (¬〈−, J, dad〉) (8)
(=⇒)WIncDes0.77M (〈M,J, visiting ht and dad〉) (10)
(=⇒)Goal0.77M (〈M,J, visiting ht〉) (11)
5. IMPLEMENTATION
The theoretical model we presented in previous sections is
aimed to be domain-independent. Yet, the purpose of our
current work in the TARDIS project [2] is to develop a
training game in order to facilitate NEETs’ access to em-
ployment. Therefore, we propose to implement it in the
context of job interview simulation. Indeed, this sort of
application appears as a promising way to increase appli-
cant’s self-confidence [17]. Additionally, job interviews are a
good example of semi-structured dyadic interactions where
recruiters have several opportunities to reason about can-
didates’ mental and affective states. Nevertheless, to our
knowledge, existing models do not include a Theory of Mind.
Our implementation was done in SWI-Prolog for the infer-
ence engine and the logical framework. This reasoner was
embedded in a C++ program that handles the reasoning
loop and the communication between the modules.
Reasoning loop
Following the classical BDI interpreter, at every cycle, the
agent interpret external events to generate a list of potential
actions, deliberate to select one of them, update its inten-
tions and then execute them:
Thresholds and level functions
The implementation of the model requires to instanciate all
thresholds (th) and combination function (f) for degrees of
believability and desirability of new mental state or the in-
tensity of emotions.
In our implementation, mod th = 0.5, str th = 0.75 and
des th = 0.7.
The combination function cannot be given in detail in this
paper but we consider two families:
Algorithm 1 ToM Reasoning loop
loop
Execute intentions()
Simulate others emotions()
Update beliefs and attitudes()
Update beliefs with new SoA()
Handle operators equivalence()
Adopt new desires()
Order goals()
Adopt new intentions()
Adopt new intentions from goals()
Adopt new intentions from intentions()
end loop
– For attitude dynamics and credibility (e.g. equation 17),
we use simple average functions on the relevant interval:
f(k, k′) = ((k + k′)/4) + 0.5
– For emotions (see equation 20), we combine the linear
influence from attitude (for instance, joy has been chosen
to be linearly correlated to the attitude toward the fact)
with a logarithmic influence of the degree of certainty. This
way, we get to trigger more salient emotions even with rela-
tively weak beliefs. Nevertheless, let us remind here that we
only consider beliefs which levels are greater than a certain
threshold (mod thld = 0.5 in our implementation).
f(l, k) =
k
2
× Log(2l − 1)−min
min
+ 0.5
where min represents the smallest value coded by the ma-
chine (i.e. the value of Log(x) when x→ 0). The 2l−1 facto
is used to adjust the value in [0,1] before we compute the in-
tensity, which is then readjusted in [0.5,1] to get significant
values.
Job interview simulation
The course of the job interview is handled in the common-
sense module: we define a series of topics that must be
adressed by the agent through speech acts (e.g. questions
about the salary, the experience...). Moreover, each topic is
associated with some expectations about the impact of the
question. Based on the current goals (in terms of affective
state for the interlocutor), the agent will select a question
(a speech act) or another.
Moreover, the agent computes beliefs about the interlocu-
tor’s self-confidence, motivation and qualification, based on
its reaction to the questions and simple TT-rules. For in-
stance, hesitating in the job description topic can indicate
they are not qualified enough while being focused when in-
troducing themselves denotes a good self-confidence level.
The perception of “hesitation” and “focused” is done by an-
other module of the TARDIS platform which is not part of
this paper (see [2]).
6. PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
In this section, we describe a preliminary evaluation aim-
ing to assess the functioning of our model and its possible
contribution in the context of job interview simulation.
Subjects play the role of an unemployed youngster lacking
work experience and applying for the job of sales department
secretary. The virtual recruiter utterances are predefined
for each possible speech act and situation in the model. No
constraint were given about a supposed personality, level
of education of professional background of the role-played
interviewee.
6.1 Method
We recruited 30 volunteers – 11 females and 19 males –, 19
of them working or having an internship at our university.
All the subjects were aged over 24, had gone to university
and were familiar with computers. 18 of the participants are
native speakers and the remaining have at least an interme-
diate level. Since we are not interested in verbal communi-
cation, this is sufficient so that the participants understand
what the recruiter says.
The recruiter’s utterances were given in a very simple Graph-
ical User Interface (GUI). The valence of the agent’s af-
fective state and its runtime evaluation of the candidate’s
self-confidence, motivation and qualification (values in [-1,1])
were represented by slide-bars. A text field allows the sub-
ject to type his/her answer to the virtual recruiter’s ques-
tions. Besides, a series of 8 sliders (values in [0,1]) gives
them the possibility to express their affective states to the
recruiter as combinations of the following affects: relieved
(REL), embarrassed (EMB), hesitating (HES), stressed (STR),
ill at ease (IAE), focused (FOC), aggressive (AGG) and
bored (BOR).4
Subjects faced one agent out of 3 possible recruiter profiles:
one that tries to make the candidates feel at ease (PRO-
FILE A), one asking regular questions, with no specific goal
on the user’s mental state (PROFILE B) and one that, asks
embarassing questions (PROFILE C). This is simply done
by varying their goals regarding the emotional reaction they
want to elicit in our model. All three agents use the same
ToM reasoner described in previous sections.
Hypothesis: The profile variation will have an impact on
the participants’ emotional states as expressed through the
slidebars.
Measures: In this paper, we focus on measures extracted
from the interaction history. They refer to the average inten-
sity of relief, embarrassment, hesitation, stress, uneasiness,
concentration, aggressiveness and boredom expressed by the
participants as well as the total emotional expressiveness
(TOT). More specifically, we measure the mean amount of
information the candidates gave about their affective states.
6.2 Results
Shapiro-Wilks test shows that none of our measures fol-
lows a normal distribution. Besides, Kruskal-Wallis test re-
veals a main effect of PROFILE on TOT (Chi2(2, 629) =
11.435; p < 0.01) and particularly EMB (Chi2(2, 629) =
6.231; p < 0.05) and FOC (Chi2(2, 629) = 9.218; p < 0.01).
This means that the profile of the recruiter (comprehensive,
4In the full TARDIS project’s setting, these sliders are re-
placed by automatic recognition of user affects using the SSI
system [32].
neutral or challenging) has an effect on the affects assessed
(and possibly expressed) by the user, and that this effect
is particularly important for embarassement and concentra-
tion.
A Mann-Whitney test then shows that participants that in-
teract with PROFILE A (comprehensive recruiter) express
more affects in general (U = 20; p < 0.05), more embar-
rassment (U = 20; p < 0.05) and more concentration (U =
21; p < 0.05) than those who interact with PROFILE B.
Likewise, PROFILE C (challenging recruiter) elicits more
affects (U = 6; p < 0.01) and in particular stress (U =
18; p < 0.05), uneasiness (U = 24; p < 0.05) and concen-
tration (U = 10; p < 0.01) than PROFILE B. We also note
that in this case, no effect appears regarding embarrassment
(U = 26; p = 0.069). Finally, no significant effect is revealed
between PROFILE A and PROFILE C. See Figure 2.
Figure 2: Effect of PROFILE factor. This figure shows the
average affects intensity expressed by the participants. The
error bars represent the standard error. Significant effect
appears on the embarrassment, stress, uneasiness, concen-
tration and the total emotional intensity.
6.3 Discussion
Theory of Mind is a complex process that relies on various
other cognitive and perceptual processes. It is not only hard
to model but also to assess. Thus, a simple protocol such
as the one we used in this study is not sufficient to fully
evaluate the impact of our ToM model on the quality of the
training. First, the GUI we used is not user-friendly and
does not allow for user’s immersion in the scenario. We as-
sume that using the full TARDIS project’s setting [2] would
enhance the interaction credibility and help highlight the vir-
tual agent’s reasoning and reactivity. Besides, the evaluation
process should be based on richer measures (e.g. thorough
post-hoc questionnaire) in order to evaluate the effect of our
model. Yet, such a specific evaluation protocol for affective
and interaction-oriented ToM still has to be defined.
In the litterature, there are validated methods to evaluate
whether subjects – generally children – have ToM abilities
and use it [6]. Nevertheless, there is no such test that inte-
grates a strong interactional aspect to our knowledge. From
the computational point of view, [15] points out the issue
of evaluating a ToM model. In this work, the course of
events and the agent’s actions and explanations are speci-
fied in advance for different scenarios. Thus, the ToM mod-
els are evaluated based on whether they match these spec-
ifications. Similarly, [25] builds expectations about user’s
actions – based on formal models in the specific context of
wartime negotiations – in order to model a simplified the-
ory of mind and then compare them with the actual user’s
behavior. These two approaches are not applicable in our
human/agent interaction situation, because they rely on a
model of the task which is difficult to describe when it comes
to afective non-verbal behaviour.
Nevertheless, the study we present in this paper shows promis-
ing results regarding the contribution of our ToM model in
the context of a training game. Although all recruiters’ pro-
files benefit from the ToM reasoner, only PROFILE A and
PROFILE C use it to select questions according to a rea-
soning about the mental and emotional states they could
induce. The more recruters ask such questions, the more
mindreading they perform. The study shows that this kind
of ToM-based behavior indeed has an impact on the users’
reactions. It also demonstrates the benefit of implementing
several profiles in the enrichment of the coaching scenarios.
7. CONCLUSION & PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we proposed an affective and interaction-
oriented Theory of Mind model to support the development
of intelligent agents that are able to represent and reason
about their human interlocutors’ mental states. It relies
on a hybrid mindreading approach mixing theory-theory
and simulation-theory paradigms. This model is domain-
independent, which means it can potentially be used in dif-
ferent context of application, including social coaching.
It has been implemented and evaluated in the context of
job interview simulation in which the virtual recruiter both
evaluates the human candidates based on their affective re-
actions, and reacts emotionally according to its desires and
ideals. This study demonstrates the influence of the imple-
mentation of various recruiter profiles on the enrichment of
the system’s efficiency. In addition, the explanatory capa-
bility of our reasoning model is a key feature for the users
to benefit from a rich post-interview feedback. While eval-
uating such a complex cognitive process as ToM remains a
difficult task, we are currently working on the integration
of this model in the TARDIS platform in order to perform
mental states evaluation using signal processing. We plan to
evaluate the impact of such a ToM model on the credibility
of the virtual recruiter.
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